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Abstract: In the 5th century a number of sophists challenged the ortho-
dox understanding of morality and claimed that practicing injustice
was the best and most profitable way for an individual to live.
Although a number of responses to sophistic immoralismweremade,
one argument, in fact coming from a pair of sophists, has not received
the attention it deserves. According to the argument I call Immortal
Repute, self-interested individuals should reject immorality and culti-
vate virtue instead, for only a virtuous agent can win the sort of ever-
lasting reputation that makes a life truly admirable and successful.
Keywords: Anonymous Iamlichi, Prodicus, Sophistic Movement,
Immoralism, Virtue
T
he second half of the 5th century witnessed an exciting intel-
lectual movement in Athens. During this time of discovery
and investigation, many of the traditional Greek world-
views were challenged and rejected. Even the centuries-old beliefs
about the gods and morality came under intellectual fire: the text
known to us as the “Sisyphus Fragment” attests to the fact that at least
some 5th century intellectuals denied the existence of the traditional,
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interventionist gods.1 And once the divine punishments for unjust
behavior that these gods were customarily thought to dispense had
been called into question, some Greeks began to wonder whether fol-
lowing the moral principles of their society was the most prudent way
to live.2 At least a few thought not. The remaining fragments of
Antiphon’s On Truth include arguments showing that breaking the
laws and practicing injustice is often more beneficial than being just,
provided that one’s injustice is kept secret.3 Similar arguments are pre-
sented by Callicles, a student of the sophist Gorgias, in the Gorgias and
by the sophist Thrasymachus in the Republic – and the arguments of
both these Platonic characters appear to be developments of earlier
arguments made by real 5th century sophists.4 It is clear that during
1DK88, B25. See in particular lines 11–26, where belief in the gods is said to have
been mendaciously manufactured by a “clever and wise man” as a political tool to
prevent people from breaking the laws and harming others. For an interesting discus-
sion of this, see Patrick O’Sullivan’s “Sophistic Ethics, Old Atheism, and ‘Critias’ on
Religion,” Classical World 105.2 (2012): 167–85.
2The author of the Sisyphus Fragment probably wondered this himself. Many scho-
lars feel that this text is a clear literary expression of the dangerous, sophistic immoralism
that developed in the 5th century. So Charles Kahn, in his “Greek Religion and the
Sisyphus Fragment,” Phronesis 42.3 (1997): 259, says that the Sisyphus Fragment is,
“the most extreme expression of this atmosphere of moral cynicism, documented in
the Antiphon fragments and caricatured in the Clouds.”
3See DK87, B44. On Truth has received a significant amount of sustained schol-
arly attention and many different interpretations of this very important fragment
have been offered in the literature. The majority of scholars hold that Antiphon
endorses the practice of intelligent injustice as profitable and rational for the self-
interested individual. Others have denied that Antiphon really endorsed the practice
of injustice, either on the grounds that the considerations raised in B44 are theoretical,
and therefore do not suggest any sort of practical conclusions at all, or on the grounds
that his account of what is profitable or rational for the individual to pursue is not –
contrary to the initial appearances of the text – antithetical to justice. I cannot offer a
full defense of the standard view here. I restrict myself to two observations. First, to
the best of our knowledge Antiphon’s text contains the most explicit attempt by
any sophist to show that just behavior is not good for the just individual. And second,
it is very difficult to understand why later authors were so concerned to defend the
profitability of justice if no one had seriously maintained the contrary view. For a full
defense of the majority view, including an admirable discussion of the secondary
literature, see Gerard Pendrick’s Antiphon the Sophist (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 315–377.
4It is now common to recognize the influence of genuine sophistic thought on
Plato’s presentation of Callicles and Thrasymachus. For example, in her insightful
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, “Thrasymachus and Callicles,” (2011),
Rachel Barney suggests that Antiphon is the historical inspiration behind Plato’s
two great critics of conventional morality. For a more sustained discussion of the
sophistic background of Thrasymachus in the Republic, without, however, attempting
to identify any one particular sophist as the inspiration for Plato’s depiction of
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this exciting period of Greek thought a number of figures argued that
intelligent individuals had compelling, self-interested reasons to be
unjust and immoral, because this offered them the best prospects of
living the good life.5
It is also clear that other figures took it upon themselves to respond
to those who endorsed the life of injustice. In the Republic, for example,
Plato tries to show that Thrasymachus’ immoralism is deeply and per-
niciously misguided. Plato’s mouthpiece in this dialogue, Socrates,
maintains that the cultivation of justice is more profitable than the cul-
tivation of injustice – and indeed that it is indispensable for the good
life – because justice produces a healthy and ordered soul, upon which
the agent’s well-being ultimately depends, whereas the practice of
injustice corrupts the individual’s soul. One of the explicitly flagged
purposes of the dialogue is to offer an elaborate response to a group
of unnamed advocates for the unjust and immoral life, and it is reason-
able to suppose that these unnamed figures include the 5th century
defenders of injustice.6
But Plato was not the first person to respond to these pernicious
views. In this paper I will argue that there was an earlier, 5th century
response to immoralism, in fact offered by a pair of sophists, which
I call Immortal Repute. We possess two versions of this argument: one
in the Anonymous Iamblichi (hereafter AI) and the other in Prodicus’s
“Choice of Heracles” (hereafter CH). We can be confident that both
versions of the argument were offered as part of a response to the
views of earlier, although unnamed, opponents who had praised the
immoral life and defended the practice of intelligent injustice. In order
to turn potential rogues away from this immoralism, our texts argue
that the moral way of life is ultimately better for the individual than
Thrasymachus, see my “Thrasymachus’ Sophistic Account of Justice in Republic i,”
Ancient Philosophy 36.1 (2016): 151–172.
5I will use the terms “unjust”/”immoral” and “just”/”moral” interchangeably in
this paper. It is sometimes suggested that Greeks lacked the special concept of moral-
ity that we, as moderns, are supposed to have discovered. I very much doubt that
things are so simple, although I will not discuss this here. In any case, when I use
just/unjust or morality/immorality I mean only to refer to the pre-theoretical
concepts of propriety/impropriety or acting rightly/acting wrongly. Obviously, such
concepts were available to the Greeks.
6That Plato intended the Republic to include a response to a group of unnamed
friends of injustice is indicated by Glaucon and Adeimantus in their restatement of
Thrasymachus’ position at the outset of book II. The brothers announce that although
they are not convinced that injustice is more profitable than justice for the individual,
they cannot help but be sympathetic to this view, for this is what everyone teaches
them (358c-d, 362c and 367b-c). Both stress that it is not just Thrasymachus, but count-
less others (μυρίοι ἄλλοι, 358c8) who advocate immoralism. Part of Plato’s purpose of
in the Republic is to respond to these unnamed others.
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the immoral way of life, because it is only through the practice of
virtue that one can win a great reputation while alive and, more
importantly, a posthumous fame resulting in a sort of immortality.
This posthumous prize is assumed to be a significant contribution to
the successful and good life, so the individual is supposed to recognize
a prudential, self-interested reason to be moral and practice virtue.
Sadly, this argument has not received the attention it deserves. I
suspect that this is due to the fact that scholars often rely (at least in
large part) on Plato’s dialogues to reconstruct the views of the sophists
and that, save for one possible yet notable exception, there are no tra-
ces of Immortal Repute in the Platonic Corpus.7 Nevertheless, it is unfor-
tunate that this argument has not been more widely recognized. For if
the claims of this paper are correct, Immortal Repute is an authentically
sophistic argument which provides us with an unmediated glimpse
into the workings of the 5th century sophistic movement.
In what follows, I first discuss the version of our argument found
in AI. Next, I offer a novel interpretation of Prodicus’s CH according
to which it implies that certain uniquely virtuous individuals can
become revered as deities in posterity and, in this way, achieve a great
and eternal fame. I conclude by briefly evaluating Immortal Repute.
The AI is a short and wonderful (if understudied)8 text, which has
been preserved in the 20th chapter of Iamblichus’ Protrepticus. Little is
7The passage in question is Symposium 208d7-e1, where Socrates reports Diotima
as saying:
ἀλλ’ οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης εὐκλεοῦς πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσιν,
ὅσῳ ἂν ἀμείνου ὦσι, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον· τοῦ γὰρ ἀθανάτου ἐρῶσιν.
I think that everyone does everything on behalf of undying virtue and the
accompanying glorious reputation; and to the extent that they are better, they
do this more. For they love immortality.
Although this is not stated as an explicit argument for virtue, it is easy enough to see how
it might be turned into one. This is one passage that quite possibly reveals Plato’s debt to
the ideas that I discuss in this paper. Platomay even admit as much, I think, when he has
Socrates remark that Diotima is here speaking just like those perfect sophists [ὥσπερ οἱ
τέλεοι σοφισταί, 208c1]. A natural way to read “perfect sophists” is indicating that the
sophists in question were morally good and not, as might have been assumed, morally
depraved. If so, Socrates is presumably likening Diotima to a group of sophists who
appealed to considerations of reputation to promote the morally good life. It is possible
that the author of AI and Prodicus are two of the sophists to which Socrates alludes.
8I know of only three insightful, peer-reviewed articles that offer sustained dis-
cussions highlighting the significance of AI: Thomas Cole’s “The Anonymous
Iamblichi and His Place in Greek Political Theory,” Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 65 (1961): 127–63; Jacqueline de Romilly’s “Sur un Écrit Anonyme Ancien
et Ses Rapports Avec Thucydide,” Journal des Savants 1 (1980): 19–34; and Michelle
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known about Iamblichus’ life beyond the fact that he was a
Neoplatonist philosopher, who probably studied with Porphyry in
either Rome or Sicily and who founded his own school in Apamea
(modern-day Syria), where he worked in the late 3rd or early
4th century CE. Unfortunately, Iamblichus does not identify the author
of the work he reproduces in the penultimate chapter of his own
composition – hence its customary name. Nevertheless, the content
and the style of the work betray its origin. Because the text makes
much of the hallmark sophistic distinction between νομός and φύσις
and evinces a preoccupation with the looming figure of “the tyrant,”
it is almost certain that our text was written near the end of the
5th century and quite likely that the author of AI was himself inti-
mately familiar with the sophistic movement. Indeed, this has seemed
so obvious that over the past 150 years there has been a race among
preeminent classical scholars to pin the authorship of this text on
virtually every known sophist.9 It is unlikely that any conjecture
regarding authorship will ever establish itself sufficiently to win uni-
versal approval, so in the following discussion I will make no as-
sumptions about whom Iamblichus was quoting. But the fact that he
quoted this text in a Protrepticus is worthy of note. Standardly, a pro-
treptic text – that is, an exhortation to philosophy – operates by argu-
ing that the practice of philosophy contributes to the success of one’s
life in one way or another. That Iamblichus could so easily include
AI (which was written before philosophy attained the self-identity as
a way of life) in his Protrepticus reveals that our text is concerned to
address the question of how an individual might lead a successful
life.
AI’s answer to this question is that such a life requires the enjoy-
ment of certain goods, importantly including the good of being held
Lacore’s “L’Homme D’Acier ἀδαμάντινος ἁνήρ De L’Anonyme De Jamblique À
Platon,” Revue des Études Grecques 110 (1997): 399–419. These papers do a fine job
drawing connections between the AI and other (roughly) contemporaneous works,
which is important to do because it increases our confidence that AI was written near
the end of the 5th century. Sadly, though, these authors do not spend as much time
interpreting the arguments of the text on their own terms or analyzing the moral
and political ideas contained within it. It is high time for more work to be done on
this text.
9See Das Recht Im Denken Der Sophistik (Teubner: Stuttgart, 1997), 321–33, where
Klaus Friedrich Hoffman devotes an entire section to the Verfasserfrage, which inclu-
des an extremely detailed and erudite discussion of previous attempts to identify
the author of our text. His discussion concludes with the sobering, yet highly plausi-
ble result: “Diese zahlreichen Bezüge erweise den A. als selbständigen Sophisten, des-
sen genaue Identität ohne weiter Funde im Dunkeln bleiben muß” (332).
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in high esteem by one’s fellow citizens and peers. Throughout the text
the author takes it for granted that his readers will be motivated by the
desire to win a good reputation and that they will (rightly) consider
such a reputation to be a crucial element of the good life. Thus, the ini-
tial sections of the text offer advice about how an individual must train
if they hope to attainmastery in any craft without incurring the enmity
of their peers (P, 95.20–97.10/DK89 B1, 1.1–2.8).10 We are told, for
example, that one must start training early and train often, for people
are less likely to begrudge others their accomplishments if they have
witnessed the long labors required for them. One other piece of advice
is particularly relevant for our purposes: since people are less likely to
resent those who use their talents to benefit others rather than them-
selves, AI informs its readers that an individual who hopes for a good
reputation must work for good and noble ends (96.30–97.6/B1, 2.7).
Indeed, our author later makes clear that the best way to win a good
reputation is to acquire complete virtue, and then proceeds to explain
how one might do this (97.25–28/B1, 3.3):
Τόν τε αὖ ἀρετῆς ὀρεγόμενον τῆς συμπάσης
σκεπτέον εἶναι, ἐκ τίνος ἂν λόγου ἢ ἔργου ἄριστος
εἴη· τοιοῦτος δ’ ἂν εἴη ὁ πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος ὤν.
We must also consider the one desiring complete virtue,
and from what word or deed he would be most excellent.
He would be such if he was useful to as many people as
possible.11
To become virtuous, then, one must become useful to as many
people as possible. And one becomes useful to as many people as pos-
sible, the text goes on to explain, by becoming a servant to the laws and
to justice, since these are what hold cities together and allow for friend-
ship among citizens (98.10–13/B1, 3.6).
Alreadywe can detect a close connection between self-interest and
moral behavior. AI’s advice is that the person who hopes to win a
good reputation should strive for complete virtue, where this means
helping as many people as possible through the promotion of justice
and the laws. Of course, living this sort of life might be quite demand-
ing, potentially requiring an immense amount of effort and labor. The
author of our text presumably senses that a number of his readers may
10I follow the Greek text of Édouard Des Place, ed., Jamblique, Protreptique (Les
Belles Lettres: Paris, 2003).
11All translations are my own, although I have profited from consulting the edi-
tions and translations cited throughout.
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have been tempted to escape the labors constitutive of the virtuous life
and instead pursue a life of luxury and indulgence made possible by
immoral behavior.12 For, anticipating an objection from those tempted
by this sort of life, the author gives his version of what I call Immortal
Repute (99.21–100.1/B1, 5.2):
ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει τῷ βίῳ μηκυνομένῳ τό τε γῆρας
κάκιον ὂν ἀνθρώποις καὶ μὴ ἀθάνατον εἶναι, [καὶ
ἡ] ἀμαθία ἤδη ἐστὶ μεγάλη καὶ συνήθεια πονηρῶν
λόγων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμημάτων, ταύτην περιποιεῖν ἐπὶ
δυσκλείᾳ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀθάνατον ἀντ’ αὐτῆς λείπεσθαι,
ἀντὶ θνητῆς οὔσης εὐλογίαν ἀέναον καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶσαν.
But since old age, which is quite an evil for human beings, and
mortality await a prolonged life, it truly shows a great
stupidity and a habituation to both wicked arguments
and desires to preserve this life at the cost of infamy,
but not leave instead of this mortal thing something
immortal, an eternal and ever-living good repute.
It is in this passage that AI most clearly indicates that the life
which is productive of an immortal repute is better and more profit-
able for the individual than a debased and immoral life. It would be
a great stupidity, our text announces, to follow certain wicked argu-
ments and desires when one could instead live so as to win an immor-
tality based on praise and eternal eulogia. Given this commitment, the
author of AI can produce a neat argument in favor of the just and vir-
tuous life. For if the life resulting in an immortal repute is so much bet-
ter than the life devoted to fulfilling wicked desires, and if the only
way for an individual to leave behind an immortal reputation is to
become virtuous, then the self-interested individual has good reason
to pursue virtue.
This very simple argument is AI’s version of Immortal Repute.
Presuming, as it does, that a good reputation is a good thing and an
immortal reputation is an exceptionally good thing, the text argues
that individuals should cultivate virtue in order to win this prize. In
this way, our author suggests that we should eschew immorality
and pursue morality.
12We can be confident that the views of certain immoralists are in the back-
ground here, both because of the mention of “wicked arguments” in AI’s statement
of Immortal Repute and because the text is generally concerned to respond to immor-
alist sentiments. In particular, see 98.18–25/B1, 3.1 and 100.5-101.5/B1, 6.1-5. The sec-
ond passage includes an argument explicitly offered in response to readers who
admire the life of an unjust, adamantine super-villain.
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One might object that our author is making a large and unfair
assumption. Why should anyone accept that no one can win a good
reputation unless they are, in fact, completely virtuous and beneficial
to a great number of their contemporaries? AI does not, either in the
passage quoted above or while giving advice about how an individual
should cultivate their talents, explicitly acknowledge – let alone argue
against – the possibility that an unjust or vicious person might win a
good reputation through deceptive, immoral behavior. And the fact
that the author does not acknowledge this possibility poses a signifi-
cant problem for the line of thought presented in the text. For precisely
because immortal fame is the carrot presented as worthy of pursuit, AI
would give a self-interested agent no good reason to be just or virtuous
if an unjust person could avoid infamy and win an immortal reputa-
tion for virtue.
There are at least two possible responses to this objection. The
author of AI could respond by conceding that although it might be
possible for an unjust agent to win a reputation for virtue, one is much
more likely to win such a reputation if one is actually virtuous and
moral. Hemight then argue that itwould be prudent to turn tomorality,
rather than immorality, because this is more likely to result in the sort of
immortal fame that his readers desire. Alternatively, our author could
have denied that it was possible for an unjust or immoral individual
to acquire the sort of reputation that produces an immortal reputation.
Although AI never explicitly addresses the question, I believe we
can saywith a reasonable degree of certainty that hewould have adop-
ted the second response and denied that an unjust agent could ever
win immortal repute. Our author accepted what I shall call the Bob
Marley principle: “you can fool some people sometimes, but you can’t
fool all the people all the time.”13 In other words, he took it for granted
that no unjust or vicious agent could successfully dupe all their peers
into thinking that they were virtuous. According to the bleak picture
of human psychology to which the author of AI subscribes, people’s
default reaction is to be upset at the accomplishments of others insofar
as they believe that any honor or praise credited to another’s ledger is
debited from their own. The early sections of AI inform us that
humans are so inherently suspicious of others that most of the time
they are convinced that their peers are hunting for a good reputation
through deceptive means. In order to come to recognize true virtue,
13One might also call this the Abraham Lincoln Principle. Lincoln reportedly
said, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all of
the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time.” Although somewhat less
lapidary than Marley’s lyric, Lincoln’s wise words make a similar point.
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these people must be forced ὑπό τῆς ἀνάγκης αὐτῆς to give to others the
respect and honor they deserve – and still they do so only unwillingly!
(96.16–19/B1, 2.3).14
We can now respond to the aforementioned objection. Given how
suspicious and distrustful the author of AI takes humans to be, he
would not have thought it possible for a truly vicious person to win
a reputation for virtue. On the contrary, the text suggests that the truth
of the individual’s virtue is the necessity that will convince others to
begrudgingly pay them the honor and the respect that they both hope
for and deserve. Having responded to this objection, I turn now to dis-
cuss the second version of Immortal Repute.
We are lucky to knowmuchmore about Prodicus the sophist than
the author of AI. Prodicus was born in Ceos during the first half of the
5th century, became a famous intellectual during the second half and
died early in the 4th century. He is best known for being a teacher of
rhetoric with a trademark ability to draw subtle distinctions between
synonymous words, yet, much like the other sophists about whom
we have significant information, he made contributions to many dif-
ferent fields, including anthropology, religion and ethics. The contri-
bution that concerns us here is his “Choice of Heracles,” a work
which was probably written as an epideixis, or a display-speech, to
advertise Prodicus’s upstanding moral character and to offer a tanta-
lizing glimpse into his philosophical system.15 Although a number of
sources attest to the fact that Prodicus composed and performed (prob-
ably on many occasions) a speech about Heracles, the only version we
possess is preserved in the second book of Xenophon’sMemorabilia. In
a fortunate turn of events, Xenophon takes pains to indicate that the
version of the CH he presents in his own work accurately reflects the
Prodicean original. This permits us to mine Xenophon’s version of
1496.16-19/B1, 2.3: Oὐ γὰρ ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄλλον τινὰ τιμᾶν (αὐτοὶ γὰρ
στερίσκεσθαί τινος ἡγοῦνται), χειρωθέντες δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης αὐτῆς καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν
ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐπαχθέντες ἐπαινέται καὶ ἄκοντες ὅμως γίγνονται.
15Scholars sometimes reflexively assume that sophists like Prodicus would not
have seriously endorsed the statements or positions advanced within their public epi-
deixeis (see, for example, W.C.K. Guthrie’s The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1971), 274–280), but this is a mistake. It is better to understand these
display-speeches as what David Sansone calls “teasers” – presentations which offer a
tantalizing taste of what a student might expect to learn if they sign up for full-price
instruction (see Sansone’s “Heracles at the Y,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 124 (2004):
125–42 (p. 138)). So although it is true that these epideixeis would leave out the higher
mysteries of the sophist’s thought, it is wrong to think that they would not have
endorsed the statements or positions advanced within them. They would have, but
these would represent only one part of their more fully developed theory.
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the speech as a reliable source of evidence for the views of the historical
Prodicus.16
The sophist’s speech takes the form of a mythological parable
designed to offer moral guidance. It begins with the introduction
of a budding young Heracles, who has just reached the age of inde-
pendence. Having retired to a place of peace in order to consider
what sort of life he should lead, he has a vision in which two women
approach him and try to convince him to adopt their preferred sort
of life. The first – named Vice [κακία] – represents the immoral life of
hedonistic indulgence, while the second – named Virtue [ἁρετή] –
represents a more traditional ideal of propriety. The speech, then,
dramatizes one mythological figure’s choice between following a
paradigmatically moral and immoral way of life.17 But it also does
16In fact, the speech is bookended by remarks confirming that it respects
Prodicus’s own composition. Xenophon has Socrates introduce the speech by noting
that he is going to present the original as best he can remember it (II, 1.21/DK84 B2,
21), and he concludes his presentation with the explicit statement that, “Prodicus
described the education of Heracles by Virtue in this way, although he dressed his
thoughts with still more splendid words than I have now done” (II, 1.34/B2, 34).
Scholars continue to question just how closely the wording used by Xenophon’s
Socrates reflects the wording of the original sophistic composition. David Sansone
persuasively argues that, “Xenophon seems to have preserved a very close approxima-
tion of the actual words of Prodicus’s display-piece. Consequently, this passage should
be taken much more seriously than it has been in the past as evidence for the thought
and methods of the Cean sophist” (2004): 126. Although Sansone’s argument was later
challenged by Vivienne Gray (“The Linguistic Philosophies of Prodicus in Xenophon’s
‘Choice of Heracles’?” Classical Quarterly 56.2 (2006): 426–435), it remains the best study
on this topic. Despite Gray’s challenge, its findings have been largely endorsed by later
commentators (cf. Robert Mayhew’s Prodicus the Sophist (Oxford, 2011), 201–06).
Though I have no new linguistic or stylistic considerations to contribute to this discus-
sion, I do want to offer one historical or philosophical consideration loosely supporting
Sansone’s view. I argue that Immortal Repute is best understood as one part of a larger
5th century strategy of responding to sophistic immoralism. If this is right, then the phil-
osophical ideas raised in Xenophon’s presentation of CH derive from a 5th century con-
text. This lends further, though indirect, support to the thesis that the contents of
Xenophon’s presentation are genuinely Prodicean. I do not expect my contribution to
be decisive. (Xenophon could have cherry-picked attractive 5th century ideas for his
own purposes with no concern to reproduce the views of any figure). We should not,
however, expect to find any decisive considerations about the authenticity of this text.
All we can do is weigh the evidence available to us in order to come to an educated
judgement. And the fact that the argument in Xenophon’s text is best understood in
a 5th century context is, I think, significant, especially since no one has successfully res-
ponded to the linguistic and stylistic considerations raised by Sansone.
17This might be resisted. Many have felt that κακία and ἁρετή were not “moral”
terms at the time Prodicus wrote his speech. So Arthur Adkins, in his Merit and
Responsibility (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), maintained that the
non-moral, Homeric values persisted into the sophistic period. He denies that ἁρετή
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more. By having the two women engage in a debate with one
another about the relative merits of morality and immorality, CH
also offers philosophical instruction to its audience about how they
too should live their life.
Vice approaches Heracles first and promises that if he follows her
path, he will have the sweetest and easiest of lives. She offers him his
fill of boys, booze and banquets, quickly adding that he will not have
to work to enjoy any of these luxurious pleasures. Instead, others will
work and he will cunningly – though unfairly – snatch the fruits of
their labor. Once her presentation is complete, Heracles asks this
champion of lazy indulgence for her name (II, 1.26/ DK84 B2, 26):18
Ἡ δέ, Oἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι καλοῦσί με Εὐδαιμονίαν,
οἱ δὲ μισοῦντές με ὑποκοριζόμενοι ὀνομάζουσι Κακίαν.
And she said, my friends call me Happiness, but those
who hate me play with terms and name me Vice.
Vice’s appropriation of the name “Eudaimonia” shows that she believes
her own way of life is the best and most profitable way of life for
Heracles. She thus encourages him to travel down the vicious path
because, she thinks, it would be beneficial for him to do so.
Virtue’s speech is clearly offered as a response to her vicious
counterpart. Consider the following tirade that Virtue launches at
Vice (II, 1.31/B2, 31):
Άθάνατος δὲ οὖσα ἐκ θεῶν μὲν ἀπέρριψαι, ὑπὸ δὲ
ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν ἀτιμάζῃ· τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου
ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ
πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε
was moral at this time and suggested instead that, “aretē is naturally linked to
strength, daring and success,” whereas kakia is naturally linked to weakness and cow-
ardice (159). This cannot be true of aretē and kakia in Prodicus’s CH. It would be
absurd for Heracles to seriously deliberate about whether he should follow Virtue
or Vice if one represented the life of daring and success, whereas the other represen-
ted a cowardly and weak life. Adkins (as well as those who share his view) is in the
grips of what Bernard Williams has, in the process of debunking it, helpfully called
the “progressivist” picture of Greek ethics, according to which aretē did not become
a moral term until Socrates or Plato used it. (See his Shame and Necessity (Berkeley:
The University of California Press, 1993), 1–20). It is clear from an unprejudiced read-
ing of AI that the virtue under discussion is a normatively-loaded virtue. Perhaps
even more obvious is that vice is presented in a highly negatively way – indeed, both
in CH and AI vice is associated with pleonexia as well as violating the rules of one’s
society. These were paradigmatically unjust ways of behaving in Classical Greece.
18I follow the Greek text of Michele Bandini and Louis-André Dorion, ed.,
Xénophon Mémorables (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013).
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σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι. Τίς δ’ ἄν σοι λεγούσῃ
τι πιστεύσειε; Τίς δ’ ἂν δεομένῃ τινὸς ἐπαρκέσειεν; ἢ τίς
ἂν εὖ φρονῶν τοῦ σοῦ θιάσου τολμήσειεν εἶναι;
Immortal though you are, you’ve been cast out from the gods
and dishonored by good people. Of praise of oneself – the
sweetest sound of all – you’re unhearing. And of the sweetest
sight of all, unseeing. For you’ve never yet witnessed an
honorable deed of your own. Who would trust anything you
say? Who would assist you if you required anything? Who
in their right mind would dare keep company with you?
Our personified Virtue calls her counterpart so base and ignorant
that she cannot even recognize what is truly good and valuable. Her
rhetorical questions imply that Vice has no place in decent society –
the obvious message to Heracles (and, by extension, the members of
Prodicus’s audience) is that those who adopt an immoral way of life
will suffer a similar fate. Prodicus does not give Vice any opportunity
to respond to these allegations in his work, and this fact is important.
When Virtue so vocally slanders Vice, Vice and the way of life she
represents become objects of scorn and contempt for everyone listening
to CH. By exploiting the structure and dramatic features of his presen-
tation in this clever way, Prodicus is able to produce certain responses
in his audience that will steer them away from Vice and the immoral
life she represents.
Naturally, Virtue also tells Heracles about her own way of life. In
contrast to Vice, who promised Heracles that his life could be easy and
free of work, Virtue is very clear that her path will be quite demanding
and may require Heracles to forgo many pleasures and indulgences.
“For of the things that are really good and noble, the gods give none
of them to humans without labor and diligence” (II, 1.28/B2.28).
Indeed, she stresses in particular that if Heracles wishes to be loved
by his friends, he must aid them (εὐεργετητέον); if he wishes to be hon-
ored by his city, he must be useful to it (ὠφελητέον); and if he wishes
for all of Greece to admire his virtue, he must try to do good (εὖ
ποιεῖν) to all of Greece (II, 1.28/B2, 28). Ex nihilo nihil fit.
Yet what an individual can hope to win through this hard work is
of the greatest value. Virtue ends her speech by eulogizing those who
follow her path (II, 1.33/B2, 33):
δι’ ἐμὲ φίλοι μὲν θεοῖς ὄντες, ἀγαπητοὶ δὲ φίλοις, τίμιοι
δὲ πατρίσιν· ὅταν δ’ ἔλθῃ τὸ πεπρωμένον τέλος,
οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἄτιμοι κεῖνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν
ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. Τοιαῦτά σοι, ὦ παῖ
τοκέων ἀγαθῶν Ἡράκλεις, ἔξεστι διαπονησαμένῳ
τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτῆσθαι.
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Because of me they are dear to the gods, loved by their
friends and honored by their fatherland. And indeed, when
they come to their fated end, they do not lie dishonored and
forgotten, but they blossom through memory and are sung
about for all time. Oh Heracles, child of good parents, if you
cultivate yourself as I have described you may win the
most blessed happiness.
Those who pursue virtue can look back on their life with pride,
enjoy old age and rejoice in the love they get from others. Most impor-
tantly, though, once the virtuous die they are not forgotten or slan-
dered, but they are remembered and honored for all time. The clear
implication of this passage is that this immortal memory and honor
makes the life of the one who possesses it successful and supremely
happy. Virtue’s advice to Heracles is, then, to travel the path of moral-
ity so that he may experience a blessed happiness through winning an
immortal reputation.
It must be noted that this is not just the end of Virtue’s speech; it is
also the end of Prodicus’s whole epideixis. In other words, the climax of
Virtue’s lesson to Heracles is also the climax of Prodicus’s lesson to his
audience. This suggests that Prodicus endorsed Virtue’s preferred way
of life, accepted her understanding of the most blessed happiness and
agreed that it was in an individual’s self-interest to be moral. So, too,
does Prodicus’s use of the figure of Heracles. As every member of
Prodicus’s audience would have known, Heracles completed many
great labors and saved Greece from many terrible miseries. And
because of his benefaction, he – true to Virtue’s words – continues to
be remembered and honored to this very day. In this way, the sophist’s
choice of Heracles serves as a confirmation that those who follow the
virtuousway of life canwin an undying fame. As one further bit of evi-
dence that Prodicus ultimately endorsed the position advanced by his
Virtue, note that in Xenophon’sMemorabilia Socrates uses the sophist’s
speech in order to exhort his interlocutor towards a moderate and
moral way of life (II, 1.1). This seems to confirm that Prodicus’s pur-
pose with CH was to encourage justice rather than injustice, morality
rather than immorality. Thus, we have good reason to conclude that
Prodicus endorsed the account of happiness and the best life advanced
by Virtue.19
19This claim is at odds with the interpretation of our text found in Robert
Mayhew’s recent and influential book, Prodicus the Sophist. According to Mayhew,
CH does not ultimately endorse the virtuous way of life as preferable to the vicious
way of life. Instead, it offers a real choice between the path of Virtue and of Vice.
Prodicus is said to hold the view that, “there are no objective moral truths and/or
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There is, however, one looming objection to my claim that
Prodicus ultimately endorsed the account of the most blessed happi-
ness presented by his Virtue. Although I think it ultimately fails, I will
spend some time working through the objection because doing so
allows one to better understand CH and to more fully appreciate the
radical nature of this text.
The objection takes its cue from the fact that in CH Virtue refers
to traditional-sounding gods a number of times.20 We have seen this
above. Virtue tells Heracles that nothing good is given to humans
from gods without hard work and care (II, 1.28/B2, 28); she says
that Vice has been cast out of the immortals (II, 1.31/B2, 31); and
she twice says that those who follow her way of life are dear to
the gods (II, 1.32–33/B2, 32–33). This is all rather surprising since
we have independent evidence that Prodicus gave a genealogical
account detailing how the Greeks came to believe in the gods which
likely denied their very existence.21
moral absolutes, by reference to which it can be said that everyone ought to pursue a
life of Virtue. . .Prodicus makes a case for the life of Virtue and the life of Vice”
(2011), 205.
Mayhew’s book is very helpful in many ways, but I cannot accept this feature of
his interpretation. It seems to me to be a serious mistake to think that Prodicus
would have been concerned with the concept of objective or absolute moral truths
at all. But even granting for the sake of argument that Prodicus entertained the pos-
sibility that there were such truths only to reject it, it does not follow that the path of
Virtue and Vice are equally worthy of choice. Prodicus’s question was not “what are
the absolute moral truths?” but rather “what way of life would make me – or any
other individual, for that matter – happiest?” And it seems to me clear that CH repre-
sents the virtuous life as (prudentially) better than the life of vice. This suspicion is
confirmed by the fact that Xenophon’s Socrates employs CH in order to benefit his
friend and interlocutor, Aristippus. Socrates believes that rehearsing Prodicus’s
speech will lead his friend towards a moral way of life, and that he will be better off
because of it (see, in particular, Memorabilia II, 1.16–20).
20The essence of this objection can be found in a few scattered remarks made by
Jacqueline de Romilly in Les Grads Sophistes Dans L’Atnhènes De Périclès (Paris:
Éditions de Fallois, 1988), 279–80.
21Our information about Prodicus’s religious views comes mainly from
Philodemus’s On Piety. Unfortunately, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker does not contain
all the relevant testimonia and their context. The evidence has been collected and trans-
lated in Mayhew (2011), under texts 70–78. The evidence shows that Prodicus held a
theory according to which the Greeks came to believe in the existence of the gods by dei-
fying various features and individuals of their primitive environment. He could not, then,
have believed in the literal existence of the traditional gods. It is possible that he rejected
the existence of the traditional gods but nevertheless believed in a deity of sorts – perhaps
a non-anthropomorphic one – although this seems to me rather unlikely. On this last
issue, see Richard Bett’s helpful discussion in “Language, Gods and Virtue,” Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44 (2013): 279–311.
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The objection, then, is that Virtue cannot be articulating Prodicus’s
own account of the most blessed happiness in CH. Virtue frequently
refers to traditional-sounding, interventionist gods, but Prodicus did
not himself believe in the existence of these gods. This shows that there
is something of a gap between their positions. Because of this gap, the
objection continues, a careful interpreter should avoid identifying
Prodicus’s understanding of eudaimonia with Virtue’s.
I agree completely that Prodicus could not have literally believed
in the statements his Virtue makes about the gods, but I do not think
it follows from this that he did not endorse her account of the best life
or what is ultimately good for the individual.
Consider first that CH is an epideixis couched in the form of a
mythological parable. Parables do not normally function by pre-
senting stories which are literally true. Instead, they use stock cha-
racters and familiar tropes in order to convey an important moral
lesson. The audience of CH was not to understand, I take it, that
Heracles literally sat himself down at a rock and was visited by
two apparitions who engaged in a philosophic debate over what life
he should live. Was this a real event or was it imagined? The truth is
that it simply does not matter.22 Since Prodicus obviously did not
expect his speech’s allegorical framework to be understood literally,
he could have endorsed the essentials of Virtue’s account while
nonetheless rejecting the mystical and religious details of her
speech, which, in any case, are not essential to her position.
Second – and more importantly – as David Sedley has recently
argued, 5th century intellectuals had to be quite careful about advertis-
ing their heretical religious commitments.23 Whether one understands
Prodicus to be a complete atheist or simply a radical revisionist about
the gods, he certainly would have needed to exercise extreme caution
in advertising his beliefs. It would have been dangerous for him to
openly state his radical views and he may have welcomed the oppor-
tunity to pay lip-service to the traditional religious orthodoxies in his
mythological parable. The mere fact that Virtue mentions the gods
does not, then, entail that Prodicus could not have endorsed the core
of her response to Vice’s position or her own articulation of what
makes life good.
22Indeed, the very language of the text emphasizes the vague or hypothetical
nature of the story. The speech says that two women “appeared” to approach, using
the Greek “φανῆναι” with a supplementary infinitive. This construction expresses
doubt about whether the appearance was in fact true (Smyth, 2143).
23See his “The Atheist Underground,” in V. Harte and M. Lane, ed., Politeia in
Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 329–48.
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It is entirely likely, however, that Prodicus wanted the intelligent
members of his audience to think through these questions and wonder
about the place of the gods in CH. For in thinking through these ques-
tions one quickly sees that CH’s veneer of piety is in fact compatible
with a deeper, more subversive and tantalizing interpretation.
To the best of our knowledge, the historical Prodicus maintained
that the Greeks came to believe in the gods when their ancestors dei-
fied the useful features of their environment and then, after this, the
individuals who bestowed great services on humankind. Robert
Mayhew summarizes Prodicus’s account as follows:
(1) Primitive people came to regard certain aspects of nature – ‘the
nourishing and useful’ (τά τρέφοντα καὶ ὠφελοῦντα) – as gods; for
example, the sun, the moon, rivers and springs, trees from which
they gathered fruit, or vegetation generally.
(2) Primitive people also came to regard certain people (and their
discoveries) as gods – those who first discovered what is
nourishing and otherwise useful.24
It is the second stage that concerns us here. The woman who first
discovered agriculture, for example, was called Demeter and was
prayed to so that our ancestors could continue to enjoy the fruits of
the field; the first man to successfully make wine was called
Dionysus and had festivals named in his honor, presumably to encour-
age the production and consumption of further vintages. Although the
24Mayhew (2011), 180–81, who is developing on Albert Henrichs’s groundbreak-
ing textual work and commentary on the Prodicean sections of On Piety (see both ‘Die
Kritik der Stoischen Theologie im Pherc. 1428,” Cronache Ercolanesi 4 (1974): 5–32 and
“Two Doxographical Notes: Democritus and Prodicus on Religion,” Harvard Studies
in Classical Philology 79 (1975): 93–123). Although a full treatment of the evidence
regarding Prodicus’s fascinating theory about the origin of religious belief is beyond
the scope of this essay, one important fragment of On Piety is sufficiently important
that it deserves to be quoted here (PHerc. 1428, Col. 3.2–13, Henrichs (1975): 116):
τὰ τρέφοντα καὶ ὠφελοῦντα θεοὺς
νε|νομίσθα̣ι καὶ τετειμ̣ῆσ̣θ̣[̣αι πρῶτον̣ ̣ ὑπὸ ̣
[Προ]δί̣κου γεγ̣ραμμ̣έν̣α, μ[ε]τὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺ[ς εὑρ]όντ̣ας
ἢ τρο̣φ̣ὰς ἢ [σ]κέπας ἢ τὰς ἄλλας τέ[χ]να̣ς
ὡ̣ς ̣ Δ̣ήμητρα κα̣ὶ Δι[όνυσον] καὶ το̣[̣ὺς Διοσκούρ]ου[̣ς. . .
The nourishing and beneficial things, as Prodicus wrote,
first were considered and honored as gods, and after this
those who discovered either nourishment or shelter or the
crafts as Demeter and Dionysus and the Discuri. . .
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details of this process are not at all clear, this must have happened a
number of times over a long period of time. At some point humankind
forgot that they were honoring the memory of mere mortals and came
to regard the objects of their worship as truly divine. Finally, the
Greeks started to believe in a core number of gods and these ultimately
became canonized in the works of Homer and Hesiod.
What is particularly striking about this genealogical account of the
development of religious belief is how well it can be mapped onto
Virtue’s message in CH. This, I believe, is no coincidence. Prodicus
wrote CH to contain two different, yet compatible and reinforcing
interpretations of his text: one superficial and easily understood, the
other accessible only to the clever members of the audience who were
familiar with his anthropological work.
Consider the superficial interpretation first. Those in the audience
who had no knowledge of Prodicus’s other works or philosophical
ideas could understand Virtue to be maintaining that, upon their
death, virtuous individuals might be remembered, sung about by their
decedents and – perhaps if they were exceptional – by their city as
well. Any audience member who accepted that winning this sort of
loving memory would contribute to the success of their life and
accepted that practicing virtue was the only reasonable strategy for
winning this sort of memory would thereby incur a strong prudential
consideration in favor of the moral life.
Now consider the deeper interpretation of CH. The few clever
members of Prodicus’s audience who knew something about his gene-
alogical account of religious belief might detect a different promise
made by Virtue. They might hear Virtue whispering between the lines
that an individual could truly become revered as a god after their
death. For if Prodicus was right and the pantheon of gods were once
mortal individuals, it should in principle be possible for another indi-
vidual to become revered as a god in the future. They would presum-
ably have to be spectacularly virtuous, but the stagewas set for anyone
to manufacture their own apotheosis by attaining the undying esteem
of posterity.25
25Another way to express the difference between the two interpretations of CH
would be to adopt the vocabulary of “exclusive” and “inclusive” immortality devel-
oped by Bruno Currie in his provocative book, Pindar and the Cult of Heroes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). According to Currie, someone achieves
exclusive immortality by becoming an object of memory and continual renown after
their death. Inclusive immortality is a richer conception of immortality, as it combines
all the features of exclusive immortality with “immortality of cult, or another form of
literal immortality” (73). On what I call the superficial interpretation of CH, Virtue is
promising that moral individuals can win eternal renown from their descendants and
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I suspect that some readers may find this “deeper” interpretation
of CH farfetched. Allow me to give a few considerations to enhance
the plausibility of my interpretation. First of all, one must note that if
Prodicus ever hoped to indicate in a public epideixis that an exception-
ally virtuous individual could become revered as a god in the future,
he could never have said so in somanywords. This is not only because
he would have risked being punished for voicing such a heretical sug-
gestion. It is also because the Greeks who revered the gods thought
they genuinely existed – and thought they existed qua immortal-and-
living-gods not qua mortal-and-dead-benefactors. If Prodicus were to
convince all the Greeks that his genealogical account was correct, he
would at the same time destroy their belief in the existence of the gods.
And this, in turn, would destroy the very possibility of anyone being
revered as a god in the future.
Second, one should consider again Prodicus’s choice of Heracles
for this epideixis. As I have already noted, Heracles would seem to be
a fitting figure insofar as anyone listening to CH would have known
that he had followed a virtuous way of life and achieved an immortal
fame because of it. But Heracles is also a fitting figure for someone
wishing to hint that the Greeks’ gods were ultimately no more than
deified projections of the great mortal men and women who had once
conferred a spectacular benefit to humankind.26 Every member of
Prodicus’s audience would surely have known that, according to the
myths, Heracles was born a mortal and that it was only at the time
of his death – after having been recognized as the greatest of all
Greek heroes – that hewas immortalized, when immolated at the peak
their city. This corresponds nicely to Currie’s exclusive immortality. According to my
deeper interpretation, Virtue is suggesting that an exceptional individual may win,
beyond eternal renown, the status of a god, who is sung about and revered by their
community in posterity. This nicely corresponds to the cult aspect of inclusive immo-
rality.
A central claim of Currie’s book is that one finds evidence in Pindar’s work
showing that some ancient Greeks truly aspired to inclusive immortality. There are
some problems with his argument. It is by no means obvious to me, for example, that
anyone in the ancient world aspired to literal immortality (which I understand to be
continued and unbroken conscious existence coupled with the ability to act as an
agent). Still, Currie persuasively argues that the Greeks were familiar with a concep-
tion of immortality that went beyond merely being remembered and included other
notable features, such as having shrines or temples made in one’s honor and being
celebrated as a cult figure in civic rituals. This is a salutary finding for my thesis,
for it is this richer understanding of immortality that Virtue appeals to in the deeper
interpretation of CH.
26Currie (2005), 77, also stresses the appropriateness of the Heracles example.
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of Mt. Oeta in central Greece, and elevated to the rank of a god.
It seems unlikely that this is all a coincidence. Within the religious
myths there existed one figure who illustrated the very truth of
Prodicus’s genealogical account of the belief in the gods: born amortal,
Heracles was later welcomed into the divine ranks because of the great
services he rendered to his fellow Greeks. By using Heracles in his CH,
Prodicus hints that this might happen again.
Third, one should note that by encouraging others to pursue a vir-
tuous and beneficial way of life, Prodicus might well have believed
that he was conferring a great benefit on all of Greece. Consequently,
CH can be read as Prodicus’s attempt to win blessed happiness for
himself. Note that at one point in CH, Virtue confesses to Heracles,
“if you were to turn to my path you would become an exceptionally
goodworker of noble and august deeds, and I may appear still more hon-
ored and distinguished for good things” (II, 1.27/B2, 27). By performing
CH, Prodicus was himself playing the role of Virtue to his audience.
Just as Virtue, the goddess, hoped that Heracles wouldmake her more
honored and distinguished, Prodicus surely hoped that he would
become more distinguished by playing the role of Virtue to all of
Greece. This lends further support to the view that Prodicus accepted
the account of the best and happiest life given by Virtue, for CH may
have been part of his own attempt to win this blessed happiness for
himself.
These three considerations make the deeper reading of CH rather
compelling. I conclude that Prodicus expected at least some of his
audience to connect the dots and infer from his speech that mortal
individuals could, in some rare circumstances, bridge the gap between
the human and the divine. This surely makes CH’s version of Immortal
Repute quite powerful and extremely appealing. Very few Greeks
could have denied that any person sung about for all time, remem-
bered by future generations and honored as a god had lived a success-
ful and happy life, if not a completely ideal life. If Prodicus’s clever
audience members were convinced that they might be able to win a
posterity of praise for themselves through their virtuous behavior,
they would have incurred a very strong consideration in favor of
adopting the moral life and cultivating virtue.
It should be obvious by now how the argument presented in CH
resonates with the argument found in AI. In CH Virtue tells Heracles
(and, implicitly, anyone else listening) that he can be sung about and
praised for all time if only he follows the virtuous path and puts
in the hard work required to aid his peers and country. Similarly,
AI maintains that an individual can achieve an immortal good name
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after benefiting as many people as possible and acquiring complete
virtue. Of course, there are differences between the two versions of
the argument. According to the deeper interpretation of CH advanced
here, it is in principle possible for supremely virtuous human beings to
become revered as gods in posterity. I can find nothing to parallel this
exciting suggestion in the AI: the author of the latter text seems content
to promise virtuous individuals an undying repute of a more mun-
dane variety. But as tantalizing as Prodicus’s suggestion may be, the
possibility of winning a literal apotheosis is unnecessary for the argu-
ment to succeed. The core of Immortal Repute is the promise of a post-
humous reputation, and this is a promise Virtue makes to Heracles
on any reasonable interpretation of CH.
I turn now to discuss how successful Immortal Repute is as an
argument and what role it played in 5th century responses to immoral-
ism. As far as I can see, there are three problems with the argument.
First, the argument will only have any psychological traction on those
who already care about winning a posthumous fame or, more gener-
ally, who care deeply about what happens after their death. All those
who were concerned only to make the best of their time on earth, if
such people really existed in the 5th century, would have denied that
a posthumous reputation had any impact on the success or happiness
of their life. For this reason, these people would have been unmoved
by Immortal Repute. Second, even granting the skeptical account of
human psychology presupposed by the author of AI, it is probably
unfair to assume that only virtuous individuals canwin the sort of rep-
utation required by the argument. We are all familiar with a few ques-
tionable and duplicitous characters who somehow manage to be held
in high esteem by a great many people. Our own personal experiences
make it difficult to believe that no unjust individual can win the sort of
reputation that AI and CH assume is only available to genuinely virtu-
ous agents.
Finally, it must be admitted that the short supply of reputation
poses a real problem for the argument. Repute, especially in its post-
humous variety, is a scarce good. It can only ever be a small minor-
ity of individuals who are crowned with the wreath of eternal fame.
Neither AI nor CH could guarantee that everyone who followed
their advice and cultivated virtue would win the repute that, on
their account, confers a sort of immortality and makes a life success-
ful and happy. Some of those who read or heard Immortal Repute
presumably would have realized this, and they would have had to
weigh the chances of winning an immortal reputation against the
possibility that all their hard work would result in naught. A few
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might reasonably have decided that their chances were so slim that
they would be better off pursuing a different sort of life – perhaps
even the life of ease and indulgence praised by Vice or the other
champions of immoralism.
The first two problems are serious, and I do not know if the
authors of CH or AI could have responded to them in a way that
would satisfy readers of this journal. I suspect that both authors simply
took it for granted that everyone would care about what people
thought about them after they died, and I doubt that they would have
had much to say to anyone who sincerely averred that they had no
such cares or concerns. Similarly, I doubt that either author would
have had anything to say about the second problem. Indeed, I believe
it was Plato who later identified the existence of this problemwhen, in
the Republic, he had Glaucon hypothesize a completely vicious agent
who nonetheless appears to others as completely virtuous and wins
a great reputation on account of his apparent virtue (360e-362c).
Much of the philosophic work of the Republic is geared towards show-
ing that even this unjust individual would be miserable, which sug-
gests that no earlier thinker had taken the possibility of such an
individual seriously.
I think, though, that our authors would have had something
to say about the third problem, and we can see this by taking
stock of the context in which the two versions of Immortal Repute
were made.
The first thing to note is that AI’s response to immoralism is
not limited to its presentation of Immortal Repute. The text contains
a second argument in defense of the just and moral life, according
to which every member of a political community has compelling
reason to respect the principles of justice because compliance with
these principles is necessary for the well-functioning of the com-
munity, upon which the happiness of all citizens depends. Each
act of injustice threatens to undermine the cooperative community
that everyone, including the unjust agent, requires. For this rea-
son, no one should ever be unjust. Call this argument Political
Animals.
In AI, then, we find two different arguments for the same basic
conclusion that people must reject the practice of injustice and instead
embrace morality in order to live well and be happy. I suggest that nei-
ther argument was meant to stand in isolation, but that each was
meant to complement and reinforce the other. Whereas Political
Animals shows that qua member of a larger community everyone has rea-
son to be just and play fair with others, Immortal Repute shows that qua
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self-interested individual even themost capablemembers of society, who
might otherwise reject the conventional rules of morality, have com-
pelling reason to be just and virtuous. The cumulative effect of both
arguments is more powerful than the effect of each on their own,
and by making both together AI offers an impressive and serious
response to the 5th century proponents of immoralism.
This is an attractive suggestion, but it raises the question of why
CH does not include its own version of Political Animals, or in any case
some other argument with a similar import, alongside Immortal Repute.
Did Prodicus think that his version of Immortal Reputewas sufficient to
combat immoralism all on its own? Although any answer to this ques-
tion must be somewhat speculative, I want to suggest that Prodicus’s
version of the argument was also offered only as one part of a larger
response to immoralism. Consider that in the Memorabilia Socrates
presents Prodicus’s display-speech as one part of a larger interven-
tion ultimately designed to convince his interlocutor, Aristippus,
to moderate his pernicious desires and become a better person.
This suggests that Socrates thought that the message of CH, how-
ever beneficial, needed to be reinforced or augmented through fur-
ther measures.27 This is one piece of indirect evidence suggesting
that CH may not have been intended to succeed all on its own.
It is vital to remember that Prodicus’s work was only an epideixis
and was never intended to convey everything the sophist
believed. It is likely that in his full teaching he would have pro-
vided additional considerations or theories about how to live well
and successfully.
I tentatively conclude, then, that the authors of CH and AI
offered Immortal Repute as one part of a larger defense of justice,
which would have included other arguments and considerations
in favor of virtue. This being the case, it was no great loss if some
people remained skeptical of Immortal Repute; the defenders of
morality had other arrows in their quiver for such hold-outs.
My discussion of the problems facing Immortal Repute was not
meant to disparage the argument. Though it is not perfect, I believe
that the argument latches on to a deep and enduring feature of human
psychology. Even today most of the people we know care deeply
about how they will be remembered after their death, if not by the
whole world then at least by their children and friends. And many
of us know some people who ardently desire to be admired and
27In the case of Aristippus, the further measures appear to be a discussion of
Hesiod’s poetry and subjection to the Socratic elenchus (Memorabilia II, 1.1–20).
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remembered for all time.28 We should not look down on the sophistic
attempt to harness this desire in order to combat the threat of immor-
alism. Instead, we should regard Immortal Repute as an innovative and
insightful argument designed to promote a noble end.
28I gave two versions of this paper at Princeton University and after each of the
talks, at least one member of the audience confessed to desiring eternal fame for him
or herself.
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